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STOP AND FRISK IN NEW YORK: FLEEING
SUSPECTS AND ANONYMOUS TIPS
I. Introduction
Police-citizen street encounters are inherently troublesome because
they must necessarily be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.' Nevertheless, New York's proliferation of inharmonious stop-and-frisk decisions
necessitates a critical examination of certain patterns of inconsistency.

2

This Note focuses on two areas of uncertainty: the authority to stop
and frisk fleeing suspects 3 and the appropriate grounds to stop and
frisk a suspect based on an anonymous tip. 4 Four years ago, the
5
ambiguities of a controversial New York Court of Appeals decision
threw the lower courts into disarray as to the standard of suspicion
necessary to justify a police officer's pursuit of a fleeing suspect., This

1. People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14, 19, 409 N.E.2d 958, 960, 431 N.Y.S.2d
485, 488 (1980). See infra note 98 and accompanying text concerning the necessity for
case-by-case determinations.
Such street encounters comprise the area of law commonly known as stop and
frisk. Generally, stop-and-frisk situations arise when a law enforcement officer either
observes or is informed of particularly suspicious circumstances and approaches a
suspect in a detentive manner. Such a "stop" may lead to a "frisk,"-a pat-down of
the suspect's outer clothing-if the officer has a justified reasonable belief that the
suspect is armed. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2. Abramovsky, Stop and Frisk, 188 N.Y.L.J. 1, Sept. 15, 1982, at 1, col. 1. "At
present, it may be argued that there is no discernible pattern in the decisions of the
New York Court of Appeals .... The various Appellate Divisions are in equal
disarray." Id. at 3, col. 1.
3. See infra notes 62-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
4. See infra notes 101-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
The term "anonymous tips" applies to the ways in which police officers receive
information concerning criminal activity through sources whose reliability is unverified. Most of these tips come from unknown persons who approach police officers in
the street and from radio runs from police headquarters, which often originate from
anonymous phone calls, such as those received through New York City's "911" emergency telephone hotline.
5. See People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, 408 N.E.2d 908, 430 N.Y.S.2d 578 (43 decision), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980).
6. In Howard, the court of appeals ruled that pursuit is justified only upon
probable cause that a crime has been or is being committed. Id. at 586, 408 N.E.2d
at 910, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 581. However, in dictum, the court characterized pursuit in
such a way as to suggest that a lesser degree of suspicion-reasonable suspicionmight suffice. Id. at 590, 408 N.E.2d at 913, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 583. See infra note 75
and accompanying text concerning this ambiguous language. See infra notes 15 & 16
for discussions of probable cause and the more lenient standard of reasonable suspicion. Some lower courts have disregarded the strict holding of Howard. Others have
adhered to Howard's dictum in upholding pursuit based upon reasonable suspicion.
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Note attempts to clarify those ambiguities and suggests a more reasonable approach for adoption by the court of appeals. 7 This Note also
explores the extent to which an anonymous tip can serve as a predicate
for a stop-and-frisk action by a police officer. 8 This issue requires
discussion of police officers' corroboration of such unverified information. This Note identifies two apparently conflicting lines of cases in
New York" and offers a recommendation to resolve this conflict.' 0
The authority for stop-and-frisk procedure is both constitutional"
and statutory.' 2 New York's Criminal Procedure Law codifies the
reasonableness standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Terry v.
Ohio, " in which the Court recognized the need for police initiated
confrontations with private citizens based upon less than probable
See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases. See also
Preiser, Confrontations Initiated by the Police on Less than Probable Cause, 45
ALBANY L. REV. 57, 76-77 (1980); Oberly, The Policeman's Duty and the Law
Pertaining to Citizen Encounters, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 653, 654-57 (1981) for
commentary concerning Howard.
7. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text concerning this recommendation.
8. See supra note 4.
9. See infra notes 129-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
10. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text concerning this recommendation.
11. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). On the same day, the Supreme Court
decided Sibron v. New York and Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Together,
these decisions serve as the constitutional basis for stop-and-frisk cases.
12. New York's statutory authority for stop and frisk is New York Criminal
Procedure Law, Section 140.50 (McKinney 1981). The relevant portions read:
1. [A] police officer may stop a person in a public place located within the
geographical area of such officer's employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit
either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may
demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct.
2. [Certain court officers] may stop a person in or about the courtroom
...when [they] reasonably suspect that such person is committing, has
committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor
...and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his
conduct.
3. When upon stopping a person under circumstances prescribed in subdivisions one and two a police officer or court officer . .. reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury, he may search such person for
a deadly weapon or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of
causing serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in
public places by law-abiding persons ....
N.Y. CRIM. Paoc. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 1981) (emphasis added). There is also
common-law authority for less severe intrusions based upon lesser degrees of suspicion. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
13. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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cause,' 4 the constitutional standard for issuance of search and arrest
warrants.' 5 This lesser degree of cause needed for initiating a stop and
frisk is known as "reasonable suspicion." 16 A third and less intrusive
level of police initiated interference with citizens, the common-law
right of inquiry, has been articulated by the New York Court of
Appeals. ' 7 The predicate for this common-law right is "founded suspicion" of criminal activity.' 8 The grey area between the apparently
indiscernible terms "reasonable" and "founded" suspicion is discussed
in the context of cases involving anonymous tips.
II. Historical Background
A. The Supreme Court Decisions: Terry and its Progeny
The Supreme Court first squarely addressed the issue of stop-andfrisk in Terry v. Ohio.'9 In that case, a Cleveland plainclothes detective with thirty years of patrol experience 20 observed two men apparently "casing" a jewelry store for a daytime robbery. 2' After
approximately twenty minutes of observation, the officer approached
the men, identified himself and asked for their names. Upon receiving
an unintelligible response, he spun defendant Terry around and pat-

14. Id. at 26-27.
15. Probable cause eludes precise definition. See Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949). In Brinegar, the Court explained that "[i]n dealing with probable
cause ... as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life ....."Id.
at 175. Moreover, probable cause exists when a police officer is aware of reasonably
trustworthy facts and circumstances which are "sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that" a crime has been or is being committed.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); accord Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 17576.
16. One commentator has described reasonable suspicion as "the pint-sized version of probable cause." Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN.

L.

REV.

349, 414 (1974).

17. People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, 352 N.E.2d 562, 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d
375, 385 (1976).
18. Id. at 223, 382 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
19. See supra note 11.
20. 392 U.S. at 5. Courts consistently have attached significance to the extent of a
police officer's experience. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 414, on
remand, 653 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 923 (1982); United
States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 686 F.2d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing Cortez); United
States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1977), a~f'd without op., 591 F.2d 1332 (2d
Cir. 1978).
21. 392 U.S. at 6 (each man individually walked up to window, peered in and
walked by, repeating sequence a dozen times, while pausing periodically to confer
with other).
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ted his breast pocket. He felt a pistol, removed it and arrested Terry
22
for carrying a concealed weapon.
In upholding the officer's actions, the Court made it clear that such
a detentive confrontation was sufficiently intrusive to trigger the protections of the fourth amendment, even though it was initiated on less
than probable cause. 23 Consequently, the officer's conduct was evaluated according to the fourth amendment's reasonableness standard,
by which the need to search and seize must be balanced against the
invasion that it entails.24 To justify the challenged conduct, "the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrante that intrusion. ' 25 In evaluating the officer's conduct, the Court focused on a dual inquiry- "whether the officer's
action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place. ' 26 Significantly, the Court restricted use of the
protective frisk to circumstances in which a prudent person reasonably
22. Id. at 7.
23. In writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren stated:
[i]t is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the
person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime-'arrests' in traditional terminology. It must be recognized
that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.
Id. at 16. Furthermore, a frisk of the outer clothing was deemed to be a "search." Id.
The fourth amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The New York Constitution's counterpart is identical except
for minor differences in form. See N.Y. CoNsT. art 1, § 12.
It should be noted that "even where the language of the two constitutions is
precisely the same, there need be no uniformity of interpretation," since the states
may provide their citizens with more protective rights than those guaranteeed under
the federal Constitution. Esler v. Walters, 56 N.Y.2d 306, 317, 437 N.E.2d 1090,
1096, 452 N.Y.S.2d 333, 339 (1982) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
In United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), the Supreme Court attempted to define further the point at which a confrontation becomes a detentive
stop, within the meaning of Terry. According to the Court, factors to be considered
in making such a determination include "the threatening presence of several officers,
the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer's request might be compelled .... " Id. at 554. Ultimately, the Court stated,
it must be decided whether "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Id.
24. 392 U.S. at 21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35,
536-37 (1967) (balancing test applied to search of residence by health inspector)).
25. Id. at 21. This is the reasonable suspicion standard. See also supra note 16.
26. 392 U.S. at 20.
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would suspect his safety or the safety of others to be jeopardized by the
27
threat of an armed suspect.
People v. Sibron, 8 a companion case to Terry, is illustrative of the
Court's proscription against searches based upon inarticulable hunches. In Sibron, a Brooklyn patrolman noticed a suspect conversing
with several known drug addicts for the duration of his eight-hour
shift. The patrolman approached the suspect declaring, "You know
what I'm after." The suspect mumbled a response and reached into his
pocket. Immediately, the patrolman thrust his hand into the pocket
and seized several glassine envelopes containing heroin. 21 In reversing
the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held the heroin to
be inadmissible as the product of an unlawful search for evidence,
rather than a self-protective search for weapons.3 0 Significantly, the
Court was critical of the patrolman's failure to attempt a less intrusive
"initial limited exploration for arms," as in Terry.31 Finally, it is
interesting to note Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, in which he
remarked that the right to frisk should be "immediate and automatic"
32
where a suspect is stopped for suspicion of a violent crime."

27. Id. at 32-33. While the Court was careful to strictly circumscribe use of the
frisk, it nevertheless clarified the standard of reasonableness by stating that an
"officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed .
Id. at 27.
28. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
29. Id. at 45-46.
30. Id. at 63-64.
31. 392 U.S. at 65. Many courts have echoed this view by recognizing that, when
there is reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed, a limited pat-down is a minimally intrusive method of executing an effective search. See, e.g., People v. Love, 92
A.D.2d 551, 553, 459 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 (2d Dep't 1983)(touching outside of jacket
or coat pocket deemed minimally intrusive); People v. Rivera, 78 A.D.2d 327, 32930, 434 N.Y.S.2d 681, 683 (1st Dep't 1981); cf. People v. Fripp, 58 N.Y.2d 907, 91112, 447 N.E.2d 53, 55, 460 N.Y.S.2d 505, 507 (1983) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting)
(search of leather handbag thought to contain gun deemed less intrusive than patdown of defendant's clothing); People v. Fernandez, 58 N.Y.2d 791, 793, 445 N.E.2d
639, 641, 459 N.Y.S.2d 256, 258 (1983) (intrusion was minimal where officer seized
gun as result of touching shirt held by defendant); People v. Smith, 93 A.D.2d 432,
434, 462 N.Y.S.2d 30, 30 (1st Dep't 1983) (where bulge at defendant's waist revealed
outline of gun handle, it was minimally intrusive to reach under defendant's shirt
and grab weapon).
32. 392 U.S. at 33. Unfortunately, he did not attempt to decide whether possession of narcotics falls into such a category. Id. However, law enforcement officers
have been favored on this issue. See, e.g., United States v. Ceballos, 654 F.2d 177,
188 (2d Cir. 1981) (Meskill, J., dissenting) ("[t]he law enforcement officials assigned
to enforce our narcotics laws risk their lives daily and must be accorded sufficient
latitude reasonably and lawfully to minimize the danger that incessantly confronts
them"). Judge Meskill cited United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 1977) for
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Since Terry, the Court has offered little clarification of the troublesome concept of reasonableness 33 in the context of stop and frisk.
However, two decisions underscore the Court's pragmatism in maintaining a single, general standard. In Dunaway v. New York, 34 the
Court rejected a "multifactor balancing test," in favor of "[a] single
familiar standard . . . essential to guide police officers, who have only
limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and
individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront."' 35 More recently, in United States v. Cortez,36 the Court took
notice of the problematic, open-ended terminology set forth in Terry,
but offered little in the way of remedial guidelines.3 7 The following
excerpt reflects the Court's firmly rooted conviction that a generalized
standard should be employed on a case-by-case basis, despite the
inherent shortcomings of such a standard:
Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive concept
of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person.
Terms like 'articulable reasons' and 'founded suspicion' are not selfdefining; they fall short of providing clear guidance dispositive of
the myriad factual situations that arise. But the essence of all that
has been written is that the totality of circumstances-the whole
38
picture-must be taken into account.
Two Supreme Court decisions are crucial to a discussion of anonymous tips. In Adams v. Williams,3 the Court commented, in dicta,
the proposition that "[m]ention hardly needs to be made of the infamous role that
violence has played in the illicit narcotics trade." 654 F.2d at 188.
33. Reasonableness is the touchstone by which police conduct is measured under
the fourth amendment. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973) (warrantless
car search upheld in absence of probable cause after police towed car to private
garage).

34. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
35. Id. at 213-14. In rejecting the multifactor balancing test, the Court cautioned that the protections of the fourth amendment "could all too easily disappear in
the consideration and balancing of the multifarious circumstances presented by
different cases, especially when that balancing may be done in the first instance by
police officers engaged in the 'often competitve enterprise of ferreting out crime.'
Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).

36. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
37. Id. at 417.
38. Id. (emphasis added). Cortez went further than Dunaway in emphasizing
the necessity for a practical standard, susceptible to immediate and unencumbered
application by police. It also reiterated the importance of fully appreciating the
perspective of the law enforcement officer: "[T]he evidence ... collected must be
seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by
those versed in the field of law enforcement .... ." Id. at 418. From such evidence an
officer must be allowed to make "inferences and deductions that might well elude an
untrained person." Id.
39. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
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on the extent to which an informant's tip may justify a stop and
frisk. 40 Adams concerned the nighttime seizure of a gun by a Connecticut police officer on patrol in a high-crime area. The officer, acting
upon information supplied by a known informant, approached the
car of an allegedly armed man and asked him to get out. When the
man instead rolled down the window, the officer reached into the car
and extracted a gun from the suspect's waistband, exactly where the
informant had said it would be. 4 1 Although the Court upheld the
seizure, it cautioned that "a stronger case [against the defendant]
obtains" where the informant is known than "in the case of an anony' 42
mous telephone tip."

Since Adams, a sharply divided Court has refused to grant certiorari on the issue of "whether an anonymous tip may furnish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention," thereby leaving "the
state and lower federal courts in conflict and confusion.

' 43

In New

York, the court of appeals has sanctioned Terry confrontations based
solely upon anonymous tips. 44 However, New York decisions are in
conflict over the extent to which such tips must be corroborated by
police officers.

45

In the context of probable cause, anonymous tips were until recently subject to scrutiny under the complex Aguilar-Spinelli test,
which focused on the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons

40. Id. at 148.
41. Id. at 144-45. A subsequent search incident to arrest yielded heroin, a machete and a second revolver. Id.
42. Id. at 146. Writing for a six-to-three majority, Justice Rehnquist observed
that some tips are so "lacking in indicia of reliability" as to make police action
unwarranted or, at least, to "require further investigation before a forcible stop...
would be authorized." In contrast, where "the victim of a street crime seeks immediate police aid and gives a description of his assailant, or when a credible informant
warns of a specific impending crime . . . an appropriate police response" should be
permitted. Id. at 147.
43. See White v. United States, 454 U.S. 924 (1981) (White, J., dissenting, with
Brennan and Marshall, JJ.)(denying certiorari from 648 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
See also Jernigan v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 958 (1980)(denying ceriorari from 377 So.2d
1222 (La. 1979)). For several breakdowns of how the various federal circuits and
states stand on this issue, see White, 454 U.S. at 925-26; Jernigan, 377 So.2d at 1225;
Comment, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration,and Probable Cause: Reconciling The
Spinelli/Draper Dichotomy In Illinois v. Gates, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99, 106-07
(1982).
44. People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335, 341, 229 N.E.2d 581, 585, 283 N.Y.S.2d
1, 7 (1967) (anonymous call that man with gun was at particular corner provided
reasonable suspicion for frisk).
45. See infra notes 129-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of this conflict.
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supplying hearsay information. 4 This test, however, was overruled in
Illinois v. Gates.47 In place of the two-pronged test, the Court reverted to "the totality of the circumstances analysis that traditionally
has informed probable cause determinations. ' 48 Quoting Adams, the
Court recognized that "rigid legal rules are ill-suited" to the diverse
area of anonymous tips which "may vary greatly in their value and
reliability. ' 49 Although Gates applies to determinations of magistrates,50 rather than those of law enforcement officers, it nevertheless
serves to reiterate the Court's common-sense approach to fourth
5
amendment regulation. 1

B. New York's Sliding Scale Under De Bour
While New York has codified Terry in its Criminal Procedure
Law, 2 the New York Court of Appeals has formulated a more expan-

sive approach to stop-and-frisk law. In People v. De Bour, 53 the court
created a sliding scale "gradation of permissible police authority with
46. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964).
47. 51 U.S.L.W. 4709 (1983).
48. Id. at 4716 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); United States
v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949)).
"The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place." Under Gates, "veracity" and "basis of knowlege" are to be considered together, rather than independently. Id.
49. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4714 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972)).
50. This is because the facts of Gates concerned the obtaining of a search warrant. 51 U.S.L.W. 4709.
51. "[T]his flexible, easily applied standard will better achieve the accommodaId. at
tion of public and private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires .
4716.
New York has yet to consider the applicability of Gates to its state constitution.
See, e.g., People v. Cantre, 95 A.D.2d 522, 525, 467 N.Y.S.2d 263, 266 (2d Dep't
1983)(judge had probable cause to issue search warrant since informant was reliable
and his information was credible).
52. See supra note 12 and accompanying text regarding New York's Criminal
Procedure Law.
53. 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976) (People v. La Pene,
companion case).
In De Bour, the court denied suppression of a gun seized by police. The police
initiated a street confrontation with the defendant late at night in an area where
drug traffic was prevalent. The defendant, who had been walking toward two
patrolmen, crossed the street when he came within 30 to 40 feet of them. Upon
noticing a bulge under De Bour's jacket, the officers asked him to unzipper his coat,
whereupon the defendant complied and the weapon was seized from his waistband.
Id. at 213, 352 N.E.2d at 565, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 378. The defendant was not frisked in
the technical sense, as there was no physical intrusion. However, the officers' conduct
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respect to encounters with citizens in public places.- 54 According to
the court, various levels of police intrusion are justified by "precipitating and attendant factors [as they] increase in weight and competence." 55 Thus, at a minimum, police may approach a citizen to
request information based upon "some objective credible reason for
[the] interference not necessarily indicative of criminality. 56 A more
intrusive common-law right of inquiry exists if there is "a founded
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." 57 Such a suspicion entitles
police to seek "explanatory information [in a manner falling] short of
forcible seizure." A Terry stop and detention, which is governed by
statute, is permissible upon reasonable suspicion of past, present or
future commission of a crime. A frisk is a permissible corollary to the
dehtentive stop for questioning "if the officer reasonably suspects that
he is in danger of physical injury by virtue of the detainee being
armed." Finally, an arrest is warranted upon "probable cause to
believe that [a] person has committed a crime ... ."58
One of the most troublesome aspects of De Bour has been the grey
area between the common-law right of inquiry and the interferences
authorized by Terry. 5 Despite the De Bour court's delineation of
distinct categories of intrusiveness, the court did not lose sight of the
paramount consideration of reasonableness. 0 Turning now to the first
area of analysis herein, this Note will address the confusion among

arguably might have amounted to what might be termed a constructive frisk in light
of the court of appeals' own recognition of a "tendency to submit to the badge .
Id. at 219, 352 N.E.2d at 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
La Pene concerned the unlawful frisk and seizure of a gun from a suspect in a bar
who fit the general description of wearing a red shirt. 40 N.Y.2d at 221, 352 N.E.2d
at 571, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
54. 40 N.Y.2d at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
55. Id. at 223, 352 NE.2d at 571, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
56. Id. at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
57. Id. at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
58. Id. See also. supra note 6 for a discussion of probable cause.
59. One commentator has queried, "can we expect that [police officers] will be
able to grasp the nuances that are involved in differentiating between founded
suspicion and reasonable suspicion ... ?"See Kelder, Criminal Procedure, 30 SYRicusE L. REV. 15, 78-79 (1979).
De Bour, in citing Terry, acknowledged that the extent of the common law
authority to make inquiries "may defy precise definition.
... Yet, the court noted
certain factors that must be considered: "[A] policeman's right to request information
while discharging his law enforcement duties will hinge on the manner and intensity
of the interference, the gravity of the crime involved and the circumstances attending
the encounter." 40 N.Y.2d at 219, 352 N.E.2d at 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
60. Id. at 218, 352 N.E.2d at 568, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 381. "The overriding requirement of reasonableness, in any event, must prevail." Id.
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New York courts regarding whether a police officer can properly
6
pursue a fleeing suspect absent probable cause. '
III. Problems of Inconsistency in New York
A. The Factor of Flight
In the controversial case of People v. Howard,62 a sharply divided
court of appeals apparently rejected the right of police to pursue a
suspect absent probable cause. 63 Although Howard has been virtually
dissected by commentators,6 4 lower courts remain confused as to the
65
significance of a suspect's flight upon a police officer's approach.
Ambiguities in the court's language have allowed lower courts to stray
from the harshness of Howard's holding. 6 Thus, there is a need for
resolution of these ambiguities by the court of appeals.
The events in Howard concerned two plainclothes policemen's daytime observation of a man carrying a woman's vanity case. 67 Upon the
officers' approach, defendant Howard acted anxiously and evasively.6 8 When the officers identified themselves and asked to speak to
him, Howard ignored them and walked away. When the officers
approached him again, he started to run, clutching the case to his
chest "like a football." After fiercely pursuing Howard on foot, the
officers cornered him in a basement, whereupon Howard threw the
vanity case into a pile of junk in the corner of the room. After finding
69
a revolver and heroin inside the case, the officers arrested Howard.
The majority's conclusion 70 relied heavily upon People v. Schanbarger71 in which the court held that, taken alone, a suspect's failure

61. As the scope of this Note is relatively narrow, for a more encompassing study

of stop-and-frisk law, see 3 LaFave,

SEARCH AND SEIZURE,

§ 9.3.

62. 50 N.Y.2d 583, 408 N.E.2d 908, 430 N.Y.S.2d 578, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1023 (1980).
63. Id. at 586, 408 N.E.2d at 910, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
64. See Abramovsky, supra note 2, at 3, col. 1; Oberly, The Policeman's Duty
and the Law Pertaining to Citizen Encounters, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 653, 654-57
(1981); see Preiser, supra note 6, at 83-89.
65. See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text concerning these cases.
66. See infra note 75 and accompanying text concerning these ambiguities.
67. 50 N.Y.2d at 587, 408 N.E.2d at 911, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
68. Id. Until plainclothes policemen identify themselves, a suspect is justified in
acting evasively toward such strangers. People v. Towers, 49 A.D.2d 839, 839, 373
N.Y.S.2d 593, 595 (1st Dep't 1975) (mere fact that suspect fled from unidentified
plainclothesman did not create reasonable suspicion).
69. 50 N.Y.2d at 587, 408 N.E.2d at 911, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 581-82.
70. The dissent ridiculed the holding as "border[ing] on the absurd." Id. at 595,
408 N.E.2d at 916, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
71. 24 N.Y.2d 288, 300 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1969).
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to respond to a police officer's questioning regarding the suspect's
name and destination cannot constitute a crime. 72 The Howard court
also found that it was "at best equivocal" that the defendant was
carrying a woman's vanity case.7 3 Thus, the court held that the absence of indicia of criminality prevented "the limited detention that is
involved in pursuit.

74

Disharmony among subsequent lower court decisions arguably can
be traced to ambiguous language in Howard. While the court held
that probable cause was the requisite for pursuing an unresponsive
suspect, the opinion characterized pursuit as a "limited detention."
From this characterization, it might be inferred that mere reasonable
suspicion should be the requisite for pursuit. 75 The dissent failed to
take issue with this ambiguity. Rather than argue that reasonable
suspicion should be the proper standard for subjecting suspects to the
Terry detention that is involved in pursuit, the dissent contested the
76
nonexistence of probable cause to pursue defendant Howard.
De Bour's sliding scale does not permit police to take any action
beyond the level of simple inquiry absent some indicia of criminality. 77 In light of the majority's finding that no such indicia existed, it is
irrelevant whether the court based its holding upon the requirement
of probable cause or the lesser predicate of reasonable suspicion.
However, future guidance of police officers and courts necessitates the
court of appeals' establishment of one of these two standards as the
requisite level of suspicion for pursuit of fleeing suspects. An examination of both Howard and the well-reasoned lower court decisions
which have not followed the rule of Howard support the view that a
police officer should be able to pursue a fleeing suspect upon reasonable suspicion.

72. Id. at 291-92, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 102. See also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47

(1979) (Texas stop-and-identify statute held to have been unconstitutionally applied
where officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminality).

73. 50 N.Y.2d at 590, 408 N.E.2d at 913, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
74. Id. at 592, 408 N.E.2d at 914, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 585 (citing Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. at 50).
75. Id. This inference is based upon the consistency of language with that used in

Terry. See, e.g., 392 U.S. at 16, 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 595, 408 N.E.2d at 916, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 587. The dissent argued that
once [the] defendant ran away, the officers' level of suspicion was elevated to one of
probable cause ....

" Id.

77. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text for a synopsis of De Bour's
sliding scale.
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Since Howard, courts applying the more stringent standard of
probable cause either have found pursuit justified on such ground 7 or
have found no justification for pursuit," at times in apparent disregard of the totality of circumstances.8 0 Among cases in the former
category, People v. Valo 8 is illustrative of the confusion created by
Howard. In Valo, the court reiterated Howard's characterization of
pursuit in terms of "limited detention," yet stated that probable cause
was the requisite for lawful pursuit of a fleeing suspect.82
In contrast to those cases adhering strictly to Howard's holding,
other courts have held that reasonable suspicion is an adequate justification for pursuit.83 One such case is People v. Berry.8 4 In Berry, three
police officers were riding in a marked car through a high drug traffic
area when they spotted the defendant, a "known" drug dealer, 85 and

78. See, e.g., People v. Chestnut, 91 A.D.2d 981, 457 N.Y.S.2d 573 (2d Dep't
1983) (probable cause existed where defendants in subway station fled upon approach of officer, leaving behind several large packages of clothing and radios);
People v. Mayes, 90 A.D.2d 879, 456 N.Y.S.2d 531 (3d Dep't 1982) (arrest upon
probable cause where defendant, who matched radio description of robber, fled
when he saw police officer); People v. Casado, 83 A.D.2d 385, 444 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1st
Dep't 1981) (probable cause justified pursuit of defendant where pre-existing reasonable suspicion was augmented by defendant's throwing bag at officer, exclaiming
"Oh, God" and running off).
79. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text in regard to the need to consider
the totality of the circumstances in each case.
80. See, e.g., People v. Eaddy, 78 A.D.2d 761, 433 N.Y.S.2d 635 (4th Dep't
1980). In Eaddy, the court held that police responding to an anonymous tip that
suspects possessed heroin lacked probable cause to chase and frisk a defendant who
jumped over a porch railing and began to run with his hand in a jacket pocket, later
found to contain a pistol. The court paralleled the ambiguity of Howard by phrasing
its holding in terms of probable cause, while characterizing pursuit as a "limited
detention." Id. at 761, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 636 (citing Howard at 592, 408 N.E.2d at
914, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 585); cf. People v. Butler, 90 A.D.2d 797, 797-98, 455 N.Y.S.2d
647, 649 (2d Dep't 1982) (citing Howard, the court did not refer to any specific level
of suspicion, yet held officer unjustified in response to woman shouting "they're over
there; they're the ones," in pursuing and detaining fleeing suspects).
81. 92 A.D.2d 1004, 461 N.Y.S.2d 507 (3d Dep't 1983) (probable cause, based
upon nervous manner and flight of burglary suspect, justified pursuit and arrest).
82. Id. at 1005, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 509; accord Eaddy, supra note 67.
83. See, e.g., People v. Rosario, 94 A.D.2d 329, 331, 465 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213 (2d
Dep't 1983) (car leaving vicinity of burglary at high rate of speed without its lights on
created reasonable suspicion justifying stop); People v. Seward, 91 A.D.2d 1005,
1005, 457 N.Y.S.2d 869, 870 (2d Dep't 1983) (pursuit of suspect in car was justified
based upon reasonable suspicion); see also discussion of People v. Lopez, 94 A.D.2d
627, 462 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1st Dep't 1983), infra note 97.
84. 87 A.D.2d 53, 451 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1st Dep't 1982) (3-2 decision).
85. Berry had been arrested several times for drug dealing. Id. at 55, 451
N.Y.S.2d at 80. However, as the dissent pointed out, "a prior arrest record itself
[cannot] lead to the conclusion that Berry was engaged in criminal activity." Id. at
60, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
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asked to speak to him. As one officer exited the car, Berry fled and the
officer chased him. While being pursued, the defendant reached into
his waistband and threw away an object, which was found to be a
gun. Berry was thereafter apprehended and arrested on weapons
charges.86 It can be argued that the result in Berry was obtained
precisely through the kind of reasoning that was lacking in Howard.
The dissent condemned the officer's actions as lacking the necessary
probable cause mandated by Howard.87 The majority attacked the
dissent's failure "to note the distinction between an arrest and a
seizure incident to a street encounter. '8 8 Thus, the court categorized
the police conduct as a Terry interference, whose predicate was reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause. Furthermore, the opinion emphasized that the "defendant's flight [was] a highly relevant
circumstance in the context of the fact pattern here presented .... "-89
It is suggested that Berry represents the proper approach to situations involving fleeing suspects in the absence of probable cause. First,
there should be no doubt that the "detentive" nature of pursuit9 ° is
exactly the kind of police interference contemplated by Terry. Consequently, reasonable suspicion should be the applicable requisite for
pursuit. Second, by attributing significance to Berry's flight in light of
the totality of the circumstances,"' the court avoided obtaining as
"absurd" a result as that reached in Howard.92 Although no single fact
independently indicated criminal behavior, the entire context of
events reasonably warranted suspicion of such behavior. 93 The court

86. Id. at 55, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
87. Id. at 61, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 82-83. Similar to the majority opinion in Howard,
the Berry dissent refused to recognize the existence of indicia of criminal behavior.
id.
88. Id. at 56, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
89. Id. at 57, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
90. See supra note 74 and accompanying text in regard to Howard's characterization of pursuit.
91. See 87 A.D.2d at 57, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 81. This attribution comports with the
Supreme Court's view that "flight at the approach of ... law officers [is] strong
indicia of mens rea." Sibron, 392 U.S. at 66.
The Berry court considered the "kaleidoscope street scene." 87 A.D.2d at 56, 451
N.Y.S.2d at 81. It is well-settled that the "whole picture" must be taken into account.
See supra notes 16 & 25 and accompanying text regarding the finding of reasonable
suspicion. Cf. People v. Love, 92 A.D.2d 551, 553, 459 N.Y.S.2d 122, 125 (2d Dep't
1983) (a court should consider "complete picture" surrounding a street encounter).
92. See supra note 70 regarding the Howard dissent.
93. The court apparently found such suspicion to be " 'objective and susceptible
of articulation,' " 87 A.D.2d at 56, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 81 (quoting People v. Stewart, 41
N.Y.2d 65, 66, 359 N.E.2d 379, 381, 390 N.Y.S.2d 870, 871 (1976)), unlike what the
DeBour court termed "mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity." 40 N.Y.2d at 217, 352
N.E.2d at 567, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
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of appeals has observed that "[tlo a very large extent what is unusual
enough to call for inquiry must rest in the professional experience of
the police." 94 Similarly, the Supreme Court observed in United States
v. Cortez that "a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions . . . that might well elude an untrained person" and raise an
officer's "suspicion that the particular individual . . . is engaged in
wrongdoing." 95
While it may be argued that the Berry court would have found the
officers' conduct in Howard permissible, such speculation should be
avoided, as "criminal cases defy classification by categories."9 6 Apparently indistinguishable facts properly may yield divergent results because of the inherent uniqueness of each case. 97 However, in reaching
different outcomes on a case-by-case basis, 98 courts must apply the
same standards. Thus, the court of appeals must resolve the confusion
regarding when a police officer properly can pursue a fleeing suspect.
To conform to Terry, its progeny, 9 New York's Criminal Procedure
Law' 00 and common sense, it is suggested that the court establish
reasonable suspicion as the appropriate requisite for pursuit.

94. See People v. Rosemond, 26 N.Y.2d 101, 104, 257 N.E.2d 23, 25, 308
N.Y.S.2d 836, 839 (1970). "The police can and should find out about unusual
situations they see, as well as suspicious ones." Id.
95. 449 U.S. at 418.
96. People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759, 763, 363 N.E.2d 1380, 1382, 395
N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (1977).
97. "Because the totality of the circumstances in each case is necessarily unique,
there should be no expectation that comparable significance will always attach to the
same or similar factors in different cases." Id. at 762, 363 N.E.2d at 1381, 395
N.Y.S.2d at 636.
A recent case with facts similar to Howard's illustrates this point. In People v.
Lopez, 94 A.D.2d 627, 462 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1st Dep't 1983), police observed the
defendant at night, running with what appeared to be a woman's pocketbook and
continually looking back over his shoulder. Lopez crouched behind a car, at which
time the police sounded their siren. The defendant walked away briskly, ignoring
instructions to halt. When police "apprehended [him], both he and the police officer
fell to the icy sidewalk and, upon impact," drug paraphernalia spilled from the
defendant's bag. Id., at 627, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 29. The court found that the "temporary detention" was sanctioned by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 628, 462 N.Y.S.2d at
30. Although the exigencies for pursuing Lopez undoubtedly were greater than those
present in Howard, such a distinction between the two cases largely would vanish if,
erroneously, one were to attempt to categorize these cases on the basis of their similar
facts.
98. It is beyond cavil that street encounters necessitate a case-by-case approach
by the courts. See People v. Green, 35 N.Y.2d 193, 195, 318 N.E.2d 464, 464, 360
N.Y.S.2d 243, 244 (1974)(whether police officer acts reasonably "must necessarily
turn on the facts in each individual case").
99. See supra notes 19-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases,
100. See supra note 12 and accompanying text for a discussion of this statute.
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B. The Anonymous Tip
Under the rubric of anonymous tips, 0 1 New York courts have failed
to resolve adequately the issue of the extent to which a police officer
may act upon information of unverified reliability. Problems in this
area relate to the grey area between the common-law right of inquiry
and Terry interferences. 102 Before narrowing the focus of this section
to anonymous tips in the context of New York stop-and-frisk law, a
general overview of traditional use of anonymous tips is useful.
1. Traditional Use of Anonymous Tips
Until recently, the Supreme Court had not determined when police
could use an anonymous tip to establish probable cause. 103 Illinois v.
Gates'0 4 provided the Court with a vehicle to resolve this issue. In
10 5
Gates, the Court abandoned its often criticized "two-pronged test,'
established by its decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli. 10 6 The test was
used to evaluate the veracity and basis of knowledge'017 of individuals
providing hearsay information to establish probable cause. Instead,
the Gates Court "reaffirm[ed] the totality of the circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations," 108
deeming it more flexible and easily applied than the Aguilar-Spinelli
approach. 109 As the Court observed, there were inherent impracticali-

101. See supra note 4 for a definition of anonymous tip.
102. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of this grey
area.
103. Comment, Anonymous Tips, Corroborationand Probable Cause: Reconciling the Spinelli/Draper Dichotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 99, 99
(1982).
104. 51 U.S.L.W. 4709 (1983) (anonymous letter to police department, containing detailed information concerning plans of alleged drug couriers, held to constitute
probable cause for issuance of search warrant where police independently corroborated such non-incriminating facts).
105. Id. at 4716 n.ll. Generally, criticism had focused on the test's rigidity. Id.
106. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964).
107. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 113-15.
108. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4716 (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965);
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160
(1949)).
109. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4716. "The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common-sense decision whether," in light of all the facts supplied to him,
including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of informants, probable cause
exists. Id.
In marginal cases, a preference should be accorded to the issuance of warrants to
encourage police use of the warrant process and to limit the scope of searches. 51
U.S.L.W. at 4715 (citing Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 109). At least to the extent that these
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ties in applying the two-pronged test to anonymous informants.11 0
Nevertheless, by overruling the Aguilar-Spinelli test, Gates' simplified
approach to hearsay information became applicable to tips of all
informants, both known"' and unknown 12 .
Gates reaffirmed the rule of Draper v. United States,"3 which
permits a finding of probable cause based upon independent police
corroboration of innocent details when a tip from an informant whose
basis of knowledge is unknown describes facts with minute particularity." 4 In effect, such particularity causes a tip to be self-verifying
under Draper.15 In People v. Elwell, the court of appeals severely
limited Draper'sapplication in the context of warrantless searches and
arrests in New York." 6 The court ruled that such a search or arrest
will be sustained only when the details of a tip from an informant
whose basis of knowledge" 7 is unknown are at least suggestive of
criminal conduct. " 8
2. Anonymous Tips as a Basis for Stop and Frisk
In contrast to New York's strict view regarding the use of unverified
information in the context of warrantless interferences requiring prob-

rationales are inapplicable to Terry interferences, no such preference should extend
to police in marginal stop-and-frisk situations.
110. Id. at 4715-16. The Court observed that "anonymous tips seldom could
survive a rigorous application of either" part of the two-pronged test, since, for
example, the veracity of an unknown informant is, by definition, largely undeterminable. Id. at 4716.
111. For a discussion of known or "confidential" informants, see McCray v.

Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304 (1967).
112. See supra note 4 concerning anonymous informants. New York has not yet
had occasion to consider Gates in light of its own constitution. See supra note 51.
113. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
114. U.S.L.W. at 4717 (applying Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959)).
Innocent or noncriminal details, as opposed to incriminating or criminal details, do
not relate to the crime itself.
115. See People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 239-40, 406 N.E.2d 471, 476, 428
N.Y.S.2d 655, 661 (1980) (4-3 decision).
116. Id. at 242, 406 N.E.2d at 478, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 662 (independent corroboration of innocent details insufficient to establish probable cause for warrantless search
of car). See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent circumstances may
create exception to warrant requirement).
117. Elwell's vitality arguably is uncertain, in light of its heavy reliance upon
Aguilar's basis of knowledge prong and Gates' abandonment of the two-pronged test.
See supra notes 104-14 for a discussion of Gates.
118. 50 N.Y.2d at 241, 406 N.E.2d at 477, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 662. In its rationale,
the court cited inconsistent application of Draper and the problem of "hindsight
inclusion [by police] of observed physical characteristics or movements." Id. However, where a magistrate is interposed, the Draperrule remains viable. Id.
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able cause,"" the court of appeals has taken a more liberal approach
to the use of anonymous tips in the realm of stop and frisk. 120 However, questions remain as to the reasonableness and practicality of this
approach.
The Supreme Court twice has denied certiorari on the issue of
whether anonymous tips can establish reasonable suspicion for Terry
22
interferences. 12' Consequently, the United States Courts of Appeals 1
and the states 23 remain divided on this question. 24 Dicta in Adams v.
Williams 25 represents the most significant, although scant, Supreme
Court commentary. In Adams, the Court commented that the prosecution's case would have been weaker if the tip had been anonymous. 2 Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals expressed its disfavor for anonymous tips in De Bour, characterizing them as being "of
the weakest sort." 27 Nevertheless, in People v. Kinlock, 128 New York
sanctioned a permissive approach29to the use of anonymous tips in
establishing reasonable suspicion. 1
In Kinlock, the court of appeals upheld a frisk based upon police
130
corroboration of innocent details contained in an anonymous tip.

119. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text regarding Elwell's strict construction of Draper.
120. See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 135-44 and
accompanying text for an apparently conflicting line of cases.
121. See White v. United States, 648 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
924 (1981); Louisiana v. Jernigan, 377 So.2d 1222 (Sup. Ct. La. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 958 (1980). In each case, reasonable suspicion based upon an anonymous tip
was upheld.
122. See White, 454 U.S. at 925-26 (White, J., dissenting) for citations representing the "widely divergent positions" of the federal courts of appeal.
123. Id. at 926 n.2 (citations representing divergence of state courts).
124. See Note, Stop and Frisk Based Upon Anonymous Telephone Tips, 39 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1437 (1982) (thorough constitutional analysis of this issue).
125. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Adams.
126. See 407 U.S. at 146.
127. See 40 N.Y.2d at 224, 352 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
128. 43 N.Y.2d 832, 373 N.E.2d 372, 402 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1977) (frisk justified
based upon anonymous tip describing six-foot black man named "Leroy" wearing
particularly described coat and possessing gun at specific location when defendant
responded to name "Leroy").
129. Id. at 833, 373 N.E.2d at 373, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 574. In dissent, Judge
Fuchsberg admonished that "[t]o permit a 'pat-down' or search on no more than an
anonymous [tip] .. .would be to expose innocent individuals to intrusion on their
persons whenever malicious and unidentifiable tipsters accompany their false accusations with accurate descriptions of the targets they choose to name." Id. at 834.
130. See supra note 128 for the facts of Kinlock.
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Similarly, in People v. McLaurin,13' the court held that police were
justified in immediately frisking the defendant, who matched an
32
anonymous caller's detailed description of a man with a gun.1 The
most recent court of appeals decision in this line of cases is People v.
Fernandez,133 in which the court found reasonable suspicion where
police officers, responding to an anonymous tip concerning a man
34
with a gun, spotted the defendant, who matched the description.1
In apparent contrast to Kinlock, McLaurin and Fernandez, the
court of appeals established a more restrictive line of cases through its
decision in People v. Stewart.135 In Stewart and its companion case,
People v. Williams, the court distinguished two similar factual situations'316 on the basis of the specificity of detail contained in the tips and
the fact that in Williams, the tip was handled personally by the
arresting officer, who had recognized the defendant upon seeing

131. 43 N.Y.2d 902, 374 N.E.2d 614, 403 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1978), rev'g 56 A.D.2d
80, 392 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1977) (reversed in appellate division on dissenting
opinion of Nunez, J.).
132. 56 A.D.2d at 84, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 1-2.
133. 58 N.Y.2d 791, 445 N.E.2d 639, 459 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1983).
134. Id. at 792, 445 N.E.2d at 640, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 257. Upon seeing the defendant, an officer immediately touched his hand, which held a shirt, and felt a hard
object, which turned out to be a gun. Id.
People v. Olsen, 93 A.D.2d 824, 460 N.Y.S.2d 828 (2d Dep't 1983), is illustrative
of this line of cases. In Olsen, a frisk was upheld where the defendant matched a
detailed description of a man with a gun in a bar. See also, People v. Sustr, 73
A.D.2d 582, 423 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1st Dep't 1979) (pat-down justified where police
made visual confirmation of physical details of suspect, described by anonymous
caller as wearing silver jacket, standing on street corner and being "out to kill
people").
135. 41 N.Y.2d 65, 359 N.E.2d 379, 390 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1976) (People v. Williams,
companion case).
136. In Williams, a police officer personally received an anonymous call describing a " 'little dude' wearing a black overcoat and black hat" whose name was Donald
and who was "standing in front of the Super Fly Bar ... 'packing a weapon."' Upon
arriving at the specified location, the officer recognized Donald Williams as someone
he had questioned recently. The officer observed a bulge under Williams' coat,
frisked him, and seized a gun from the location of the bulge. The frisk was upheld.
Id. at 67, 359 N.E.2d at 381, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
In Stewart, the arresting officer received a radio message that a black man wearing
a long green coat and armed with a gun was standing at a particular street location.
At the scene, the patrolman spotted Stewart wearing an unbuttoned long green coat
and standing among four or five other men. When called, Stewart walked toward
the officer, who noticed a bulge in one of Stewart's front trouser pockets. The
patrolman immediately touched the pocket, felt a hard cylindrical object, and extracted eight bullets. A subsequent frisk yielded a loaded revolver concealed in a
shoulder holster. The court held that the officer's conduct had been unreasonable and
suppressed the evidence. Id. at 68, 359 N.E.2d at 381, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 872-73.
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him. 137 The court in Stewart rejected a finding of reasonable suspicion
based upon the anonymous tip supplied. Relying upon its dicta in La
Pene and that contained in Adams, the court held that an anonymous
tip "will not of itself constitute reasonable suspicion thereby warranting a stop and frisk of anyone who happens to fit that description." 38
Rather, the court ruled that a tip reporting an armed suspect at a
particular location generates "only the common-law power to inquire
for purposes of maintaining the status quo until additional informa39
tion can be acquired."
The Stewart rule has been reiterated by the court of appeals. In
People v. Benjamin,140 a unanimous court rejected the notion that "an
anonymous tip of 'men with guns', standing alone . . . justif[ies]
intrusive police action, and certainly does not rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion warranting a stop and frisk."'1' Most recently,
the influential case of People v. Klass142 was interpreted 43 as recognizing implicitly the importance of police observations, in addition to an
anonymous tip, in establishing reasonable suspicion. 144
Thus, on one hand, the court of appeals has sanctioned the use of
sufficiently detailed anonymous tips as the sole predicate for a stop
and frisk. 45 On the other hand, the court has held that generalized
anonymous tips concerning armed persons generate no more than the
common-law right of inquiry. 46 Arguably, these two lines of decisions
harmonize in that sufficient detail is the predicate for an anonymous
tip to establish reasonable suspicion. However, as a practical matter,

137. Id. at 69, 359 N.E.2d at 383, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
138. Id. at 69, 359 N.E.2d at 382, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
139. Id.
140. 51 N.Y.2d 267, 414 N.E.2d 645, 434 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1980) (frisk justified
where officers responding to anonymous tip reporting armed men at specified location observed defendant, who was standing among approximately thirty people, step
backward toward curb while reaching under his jacket toward rear of his waistband).
141. Id. at 270, 414 N.E.2d at 647, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
142. 55 N.Y.2d 821, 432 N.E.2d 135, 447 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1981) (frisk of defendant
matching description of man with gun deemed reasonable when defendant would
not reveal his name to inquiring officers).
143. See People v. Carney, 58 N.Y.2d 51, 444 N.E.2d 26, 457 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982)
(police did not have reasonable suspicion to frisk "suspicious" looking suspect who
was pointed out to police by unknown informant while police were investigating a
recent armed robbery attempt).
144. Id. at 54, 444 N.E.2d at 28, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
145. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text concerning the more permissive line of cases.
146. See supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text concerning the more restrictive line of cases.
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courts have evidenced confusion as to whether an anonymous tip can
itself support a finding of reasonable suspicion. 47 Furthermore, assuming arguendo that a sufficiently detailed tip can itself justify a stop
and frisk, it is not always clear how much detail is required. 148 The
often life-threatening realities inherent in such cases 4 9 prompt the
question of whether police officers should be required to "maintain
the status quo" by exercising the common-law right of inquiry150 when
"the answer [to the question] might be a bullet.'"', Given the Supreme Court's reluctance to address this question squarely, 52 the
burden has fallen upon the states to establish their own procedural
guidelines conforming to the broad constitutional standard of reason-

147. See, e.g., People v. Russ, 91 A.D.2d 593, 596, 458 N.Y.S.2d 185, 187 (1st
Dep't 1982) (Sandier, J., concurring). Justice Sandier there stated that the court of
appeals never has rejected the notion that a sufficiently detailed anonymous tip may
serve as the sole predicate for a frisk of an allegedly armed suspect. In dissent, Justice
Milonas cited Stewart for the proposition that such a tip supports only the commonlaw right of inquiry. Id. at 598, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
See also People v. Foster, 83 A.D.2d 282, 287, 443 N.Y.S.2d 835, 838 (1st Dep't
1981) (anonymous tip, standing alone, deemed insufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion) (dictum); but see People v. Seppinni, 77 A.D.2d 852, 431 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1st
Dep't 1980). In Seppinni, police received a tip that a black man at a bar wearing a
beige suit with a flower in its lapel possessed a gun and was "hunting to shoot
someone." The informant supplied his name and said he was calling from the bar.
However, his identity never was verified. Upon seeing the defendant, who fit the
description, the police frisked him and seized a gun. Id. at 852, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
The court upheld the frisk. Id. In dissenting, Justice Fein characterized the case as
being "almost on all fours with" La Pene, except for the physical descriptions of the
defendants in each case. Id. See supra note 53 for a discussion of La Pene. "These
differences in style of clothing," he stated "are hardly of constitutional significance."
id. at 853, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
148. Id.
149. In "evaluating the propriety and reasonableness of the actions taken by the
police, [courts] must take cognizance of the realities of urban life in relation to the
dangers to which officers are exposed daily, which often require split-second decisions, with life or death consequences." People v. Reyes, 91 A.D.2d 935, 936, 457
N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 (lst Dep't 1983).
150. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text regarding Stewart and related
cases.
151. Terry, 392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring). "It would, indeed, be absurd
to suggest that a police officer must await the glint of steel before he can act to
preserve his safety." People v. Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d 267, 271, 414 N.E.2d 645, 648,
434 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (1980).
It should be noted that observation of behavior possibly indicative of criminality
may substitute for actual verbal inquiry in raising the level of suspicion to warrant a
stop and frisk. See Benjamin, 51 N.Y.2d at 270, 414 N.E.2d at 647, 434 N.Y.S.2d at
146.
152. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text concerning the Court's denial
of certiorari on this issue.
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ableness while remaining functional as reasonably safe and effective
tools of law enforcement.15 3 Arguably, New York has failed to establish this type of a reasonable and workable approach to anonymous
54
tips.1
3. Recommendations
5
While tips of known origin may vary greatly in their reliability,
anonymous tips are uniformly "presumptively unreliable" in nature.' 56 The only factors distinguishing one tip from another are the
57

degree of detail and the seriousness of the criminal activity alleged. '

Yet, there is no rational basis to assume that a highly detailed tip

concerning extremely dangerous criminal conduct is more reliable
than a tip that is less specific and urgent in nature. A malicious tipster
easily can tailor his tip to meet these requirements."5 8 However, com-

mon sense dictates that "personal and public safety may well mandate
a more intensive police intrusion" under more urgent circumstances. '° It therefore is suggested that in cases involving anonymous
tips of dangerous criminal activity, police should have an automatic
right to stop a suspect who reasonably can be identified from the
description given.160 Furthermore, if an anonymous tip states that a
suspect is armed, a qualified automatic right to frisk should arise. The
qualifications are two-fold. First, to avoid pretextual frisks, in no case

153. See generally Stop and Frisk Based Upon Anonymous Tips, supra note 124, at
1447-48. The author cites as an example the leading New Jersey decision, In re H.B.,
75 N.J. 243, 381 A.2d 759 (1977), in which the court upheld a frisk based upon an
anonymous tip that included an accurate description of the defendant and a description of conduct (maih with gun) sufficiently dangerous to subject the police officer to
a serious risk of harm.
154. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text concerning the specific problems with New York case law.
155. Cf. Adams, 407 U.S. at 147.
156. See Anonymous Tips, Corroboration,and Probable Cause, supra note 103, at
107. See also supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text concerning courts' disfavor
for anonymous tips.
157. Cf. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 225, 352 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
158. See supra note 129 concerning falsified tips.
159. Id. Stop-and-frisk scenarios often involve "emergency situations where the
difference between life and death is often measured in seconds...." Chestnut at 21,
409 N.E.2d at 961, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 489. "[T]he police officer is experiencing the
dangers of the real world where the Marquis of Queensbury rules do not apply."
People v. Rivera, 78 A.D.2d 327, 331, 434 N.Y.S.2d 681, 684 (1st Dep't 1981).
160. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (Justice Harlan advocated
automatic frisk under such circumstances). See supra note 32 and accompanying text
for the same proposition.
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should the fruits of such a frisk be admissible unless a gun, knife or
other weapon described in the stop-and-frisk statute is seized contemporaneously. Second, as a constitutional safety valve, such a presumption of reasonable suspicion should not be sustained under circumstances clearly inconsistent with the paramount concern of
161
reasonableness.
As the District of Columbia Circuit observed in United States v.
White,112 fear of retaliation often prompts informants to remain anonymous, yet police must have the ability to act on the information they
provide.16 3 "In an antiseptic world," the court remarked, police officers might achieve their purpose by "politely" conversing with suspects. But "in our tarnished one," police must proceed more intrusively. 164
IV. Conclusion
Two of the most problematic areas of stop-and-frisk law in New
York are police pursuit of fleeing suspects and the use of anonymous
tips. Resolution of the issue of pursuit requires the New York Court of
Appeals to recognize reasonable suspicion as the level of suspicion
necessary to justify pursuit, and to abandon its ambiguously imposed
standard of probable cause. Resolution of the anonymous tips issue, in
the absence of Supreme Court guidance, requires the court of appeals
to provide police officers and lower courts with clear and practical
guidelines for responding to unverified information. Tips pertaining
to dangerous criminal activity generally should serve as the predicate
for a stop when the suspect can be identified with reasonable certainty. Furthermore, a qualified right to frisk should arise if the tip
indicates that the suspect is armed.
Kenneth M. Dorros

161. See supra note 33 and accompanying text concerning the fourth amendment's
reasonableness standard.
162. 648 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 924 (1981). See supra notes
121-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of White.
163. Id. at 44. Although White concerned narcotics trafficking, such activity is
arguably of sufficiently dangerous nature to justify a stop under the proposed procedural guidelines. See supra note 32 concerning the violent nature of the drug trade.
164. Id. at 45.
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